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Codification of late Roman inheritance law:
fideicommissa and the Theodosian Code

Joshua C. Tate*

Summary
It has long been known that most of the private law content of the Theodosian Code has not been
preserved independently of the Lex Romana Visigothorum. Certain constitutions, not contained in
the LRV but dating to the period covered by the CT, have survived in the Code of Justinian. This
article discusses this problem with respect to a particular topic:fideicommissa.The article discusses
whether a particular constitution, CJ 6.37.21, might have been included in the CT, either as part
of a general rubric concerning inheritance or as part of a separate rubric on fideicommissa, and
concludes by suggesting what the constitution might have looked like had it been under a separate
heading.
Keywords
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Judging by what survives of the Codex Theodosianus (CT), imperial legislation from
Constantine to Justinian was marked by no special fondness forfideicommissa'. Of
the eleven laws in Mommsen's edition of the CT 2 that explicitly mentionfideicommissa,
at least seven involve extensive lists of various ways of acquiring property3 . Three
others are concerned specifically with secretfideicommissaand the procedure by which
they are denounced to the government: in particular, a characteristically extreme law
of Constantine declares that those who cheat a female heir through such devices are
to be stripped of all their property and deported to an island 4. Only one law in
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas (Texas); Visiting Assistant
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania, 3400 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104, U.S.A.;
jctate@smu.edu
' D. Johnston, The Roman law of trusts, Oxford 1988, translates the Latinfideicommissum into
English as 'trust'. However, the English and Roman legal institutions were not identical, and the
translation may be somewhat misleading. Put simply, afideicommissum is something that a testator
asks someone benefiting from his / her will to do after his / her death. Fideicommissathat met
certain requirements (on which see id., p. 15) were actionable in classical and postclassical Roman
law.
2 Mommsen's is the standard modern edition of the Codex Theodosianus.
See Johnston (supra, n. 1), p. 270-271. Fideicommissaare thus mentioned in passing in CT
8.18.5 (349); 3.8.2 (382); 12.1.107 (384); 16.5.17 (389); 8.18.7 (395); 16.9.4 (417). CT 16.2.27
(390), regarding the property of deaconesses, includes a similar list, but also singles out secret
fideicommissa in favor of clerics for special condemnation.
' Constantine's harsh rule is contained in CT 10.11.1 (317). Other references to denuntiatioare
found in CT 10.10.20 (392) and 2.4.6 (406).
Q Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008
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Mommsen's edition treats the fideicommissum as a valid and independent legal
institution, and its attitude is somewhat less than enthusiastic. This law, CT 4.4.7
(424), attributed to Theodosius II, decrees that an unfinished will cannot be valid as
a codicillaryfideicommissum unless this is specified by the testator, and prohibits an
action on thefideicommissum from being brought by an extraneous heir after an action
on the inheritance has failed or vice versa 5. A restrictive attitude toward fideicommissa
could also be deduced from the fact that, unlike the Code ofJustinian (CJ)6, Mommsen's
reconstruction of the Theodosian Code does not contain a separate title 'De
fideicommissis'.

The absence of an extant title onfideicommissa in the Theodosian Code is all the
more striking in light of the attention given to them by the third-century rescripts
apparently selected byJustinian from the earlier Diocletianic codes7 . If the Theodosian
Code was compiled 'ad similitudinem Gregorianiatque Hermogenianicodicis's , one
might well wonder how a subject that seems to have been prominent in the latter
could be almost ignored by the former. This discrepancy, of course, could simply be
a function of the legal sources used by the different compilers. While the Diocletianic
codes apparently contained nothing but private rescripts, these were excluded in favor
of general edicts by Theodosius II9. It is quite conceivable that laws directed to public
functionaries would mention fideicommissa far less frequently than responses to private
individuals. One could, however, imagine a more ominous possibility: that the
Theodosian compilers, for whatever reason, deliberately excluded certain laws having
to do with fideicommissa. This explanation poses many problems, but it must be
evaluated if we are to assess the development of inheritance law in the later Roman
world.
When discussing the possible editorial practices of the Theodosian compilers, it
cannot be emphasized enough that their Code does not survive intact. It has been
estimated that we do not possess more than a third of the first five books of the
Theodosian Code, and in a good many books entire rubrics may have been lost"° .
The standard modern edition of the Code, completed by Theodor Mommsen based
on the preliminary work of Paul KrUger, is to be understood as a partial reconstruction
rather than the actual Code as promulgated in 43811. Mommsen made use of numerous
CT 4.4.7 (424). Only heirs within the fourth degree of agnation or third degree of cognation
may bring another action after the first has failed. T. Honor6, Some quaestors of the reign of
Theodosius II, in: The Theodosian Code: Studies in the Imperial law of late antiquity, J. Harries
and I. Wood eds., London 1993, p. 78-81.
6 CJ 6.42 Defideicommissis, not surprisingly, deals with fideicommissa, although they are also
discussed in other titles, e.g., 6.37 De legatis and 6.43 Communia de legatisetfideicommissis et de
in rem missione tollenda.
7 CJ 6.42.1-29. On these earlier codes see S. Corcoran, The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial
pronouncements andgovernmentAD 284-324,Oxford 1996, p. 25-42. It is not my purpose here
to address the relationship between these pre-Theodosian codes and the Code of Justinian.
8 CT 1.1.5 (429).
9 E. Volterra, Sulcontenuto del Codice Teodosiano, Bullettino dell'Istituto di diritto romano, 84
(1981), p. 92-94.
10 G. Rotondi, Studi sullefonti del Codice Giustinianeo, in: Scritti giuridici I, Milan 1922, p. 212.
There is good manuscript support for books 6-16 of the Code, but not for books 1-5, which
dealt with private law. See J.F. Matthews, Laying down the law: A study of the Theodosian Code,
New Haven 2000, p. 85-89.
J. Gaudemet, La transmission des constitutions relatives au droit successoralau Bas-Empire et
5
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manuscripts in his edition, but his most important source for the sections dealing
with testamentary succession was the Lex Romana Visigothorum, or 'Breviary of Alaric'.
In Mommsen's edition, for example, title 4.4 De testamentis et codicillis is drawn in
its entirety from the Breviary, since no independent manuscript of that section of
the full Code was available. As is demonstrated by other titles for which we do possess
an independent manuscript, however, the Breviary did not attempt to reproduce all,
or even most of, the constitutions found in the Theodosian Code 2. Of the ten original
titles contained in CT 8.18 De maternisbonis, for example, the Visigoths only included
six13, and only two of eight laws known to exist in CT 4.6 De naturalibusfihiswere
reproduced in the Breviary14 .
It is quite possible, therefore, that some laws regardingfideicommissawere originally
in the Theodosian Code but neglected by the Breviary. Given the heavy editorial
hand of the Visigoths, moreover, one could even conceive of a lost CT rubric 'De
fideicommissis' that has been excised by Alaric's compilers. The specter of a suppressed
title stands in the way of any hasty claims regarding the attitude towardfideicommissa
exhibited in the Theodosian Code.
Despite the fact that our knowledge of the Theodosian titles on inheritance is
inevitably conditioned by the preferences of the Visigoths, the sixth-century Code
of Justinian offers the possibility of filling in a few gaps. The preface to the first edition
of Justinian's codification asserts that its aim was to edit the Theodosian Code and
its two Diocletianic predecessors so that they might be combined with later constitutions
in a fourth Code that would replace them all1 5 . However much Tribonian and his
assistants may have manipulated its contents, it seems undeniable that they had at
their disposal a version of the Theodosian Code 16 that was more complete than our
own and relatively untouched by later editorial hands. By analyzing those constitutions
in the CJ that are not found in Mommsen's edition of the CT, therefore, it might
be possible to circumvent the effects of Visigothic editing.
Unfortunately, this method does not produce spectacular results. Of the laws in
the Code of Justinian that belong to the period between Constantine and the
compilation of the Theodosian Code and explicitly refer tofideicommissa, only three
do not have a predecessor in Mommsen's reconstruction of the CT. One of them
merely mentions fideicommissa along with various other ways of acquiring property,
and thus adds little to what we know of the Theodosian Code' 7 . The second is
somewhat more interesting, but does not shed much light on the question at hand:

dans les royaumes barbares, Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquitP, 7 (1960), p. 401402.
21 Gaudemet (supra, n. 11), p. 433-434.
'3 CT 8.18.1, 2, 6, 7, 9, and 10 are reproduced in Brev. 8.9.1-6. CT 8.18.3-5 and 8 were not

included.
14 CT 4.6.4 and 4.6.8 are reproduced as Brev. 4.6.1-2; the others are not found in the
Breviary.
15 C. Haec, pr.

Apart from the imperial archives, where some copies of the Code must have been available,
numerous private copies must have been made (see J. Matthews, The making of the text, in: Harries
and Wood (supra,n. 5), p. 19-20) for use not only in the law schools, but also in private practice.
For the latter, see W. Turpin, Thepurpose of the Roman law codes, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung
fir Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung, 104 (1987), p. 620-623.
16

'1

CJ 6.23.16 (380).
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CJ 6.22.7 (Quifacere testamentum possunt vel non possunt):
Imppp. Valentinianus Valens et Gratianus AAA ad Maximum. Cum heredes instituuntur
imperator seu Augusta, ius commune cum ceteris habeant quod et in codicillis vel
fideicommissariis epistulis iure scriptis observandum erit. et sicuti priscis legibus cautum est,
imperatori quoque vel Augustae testamentum facere liceat et mutare.
D. VII id. Aug. Contionaci GratianoA. II et Probo conss.
If this law was included in the full Theodosian Code, it is possible to guess why
the Visigoths omitted it from their compilation, for its first provision, allowing
emperors and empresses to acquire from codicils and fideicommissa, was at least
partially repealed in 3898, and in any event there were no emperors or empresses in
the Visigothic kingdom. Given that this law applies only to the specific case of
dispositions in favor of the emperor or empress, it cannot serve as a suitable focal
point for a discussion offideicommissa and the Theodosian Code. For that, we must
turn to the third law, which is notable for its wide applicability:
CJ 6.37.21 (De legatis):
Imp. ConstantinusA. adpopulum. In legatis vel fideicommissis verborum necessaria non sit
observantia, ita ut nihil prorsus intersit, quis talem voluntatem verborum casus exceperit aut
quis loquendi usus effuderit.
D. k. Febr. ConstantioII et Constante conss.
This constitution, like many others in the extant Theodosian Code' 9, treats legacies
andfideicommissa together. It does so, however, with the intent, not of compiling a
general list of methods of obtaining property after death, but of making a substantive
point regarding the legal institutions themselves. Formal words are to be disregarded
in favor of the testator's or settlor's intention: and thus the essential flexibility that
is a hallmark offideicommissa is affirmed even for legacies. Such a disposition, if part
of the Theodosian Code, would refute any supposition of a consistent editorial bias
againstfideicommissa on the part of the Theodosian compilers.
CJ 6.37.21 will therefore serve as a suitable test case, not only for the issue of
fideicommissa and the Theodosian Code, but also for the broader problem of the way
in which the Code has been transmitted. By tracing the path of CJ 6.37.21 through
the various late Roman law codes, we can begin to understand the implications of
our dependence on the Breviary of Alaric for what we call the Theodosian Code. In
this process three questions must be answered: (1) whether the content of CJ 6.37.21
as preserved in the Code ofJustinian is derived from a genuine constitution belonging
to the period covered by the Theodosian Code; (2) whether such a constitution could
have been in the full CT, and (3) under which CT title or titles it might have been
located.

" CT 4.4.2 (389); cf. Symmachus ep. 2.13. The constitution of 389 states that emperors cannot
take from 'codicils or letters (codicil/is aut epistulis)' and that property so bequeathed will pass
instead to the children of the deceased. However, the constitution qualifies this by saying that
the emperor may still take from a lawfully written testament or nuncupation (testamenti vero
scripturam legitimam vel nuncupationem). The constitution of 389 does not specifically mention
fideicommissa, which may explain why CJ 6.22.7 survived.
" See above.
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Although the constitution preserved in CJ 6.37.21 has attracted a great deal of
discussion, few scholars have devoted much attention to its possible place in the
Theodosian Code. Instead, historians have concentrated on the problem of its date,
for while the inscription refers to Constantine, the consular year in the subscription
(339) indicates the reign of his successor Constantius II. This difficulty is also posed
by another law in the Code of Justinian that is unanimously regarded as connected
with the fragment on fideicommissa and legacies contained in CJ 6.37.2 120:
CJ 6.23.15 (De testamentis: quemadmodum testamenta ordinantur):
Imp. ConstantinusA. adpopulum. Quoniam indignum est ob inanem observationem irritas
fieri
tabulas et iudicia mortuorum, placuit ademptis his, quorum imaginarius usus est,
institutioni heredis verborum non esse necessarium observantiam, utrum imperativis et directis
verbis fiat an inflexa. Nec enim interest, si dicatur 'heredem facio' vel 'instituo' vel 'volo' vel
'mando' vel'cupio' vel 'esto' vel'erit', sed quibuslibet confecta sententiis, quolibet loquendi
genere formata institutio valeat, si modo per earn liquebit voluntatis intentio, nec necessaria
sint momenta verborum, quae forte seminecis et balbutiens lingua profudit. Et in postremis
ergo iudiciis ordinandis amota erit sollemnium sermonum necessitas, ut, qui facultates proprias
cupiunt ordinare, in quacumque instrumenti materia conscribere et quibuscumque verbis uti
liberam habeant facultatem.
S. d. k. Febr. Serdiceae ConstantioA. et Constante C. conss.
The affinity of these two fragments is obvious: apart from the almost identical
inscriptions and subscriptions, they both remove the necessity for formal words
(necessaria ...uerborum) in various dispositions mortis causa. For over a century,
however, a controversy has persisted regarding whether they are to be joined with
other fragments contained in the CJ and CT of a general edict issued by Constantine
adpopulum in 320 or 326, or simply dated to 339 and attributed to his son2 . Both
explanations are palaeographically conceivable: while Constantinusmight at first seem
a simple error for Constantius,it is equally likely that the consular dates have been
transmitted incorrecdy, especially given the use of abbreviations 22 . Albanese, moreover,
See B. Albanese, L "abolizionepostclassicadelle
forme solemni nei negozi testamentari, in: Sodalitas,
Scritti in onore di Antonio Guarino II, Naples 1984, p. 779-780.
21 The attribution of CJ 6.23.15 and 6.37.21 to Constantine was proposed by 0. Seeck, Regesten
der Kaiser und Piipste, Stuttgart 1919, p. 59 and 169, who includes the two fragments in his
Regesten for the year 320, along with CT 8.16.1 (CJ 8.57.1), CT 3.2.1 (CJ 8.34.3), CT 4.12.3,
and CT 11.7.3 (CJ 10.19.2). These fragments deal respectively with the annulment of penalties
for celibacy and childlessness (CT 8.16.1), the annulment of provisions for forfeiture (CT 3.2.1),
freeborn women who cohabit with fiscal slaves (CT 4.12.3), and the collection of taxes (CT
11.7.3). With the exception of CT 4.12.3, all of them adopt a tone of abolishing harsh or outdated
legal rules and procedures in order to benefit the populace: an attitude also exhibited in CJ 6.23.15
and 6.37.21. CT 4.12.3 is also unusual in that Seeck has adopted an alternate manuscript reading
(the Mommsen edition has 'dat. VIkal. Sept.') in order to bring it into line with the dates of 31
January or 1 February given for the other fragments. Not surprisingly, Albanese (supra, n. 20),
p. 782 n. 16, has suggested that CT 4.12.3 does not originate from the same edict as the rest.
Seeck's inclusion of CT 4.12.3 has been upheld, however, by J. Evans-Grubbs, Law andfamily
in Late Antiquity: the EmperorConstantine' marriagelegislation, Oxford 1995, p. 120. The question
whether this edict was issued in 320 or 326 remains in dispute: while Seeck decided in favor of
the former, following CT 8.16.1 and 11.7.3, Albanese (supra, n. 20), p. 784-785, leaves open
the possibility of 326 offered by CT 3.2.1. Matthews, Laying down (supra, n. 10), p. 237-239,
argues that the evidence from imperial nomenclature and place of issue is inconclusive.
22 This problem is especially serious with regard to Constantine's reign: see Evans-Grubbs (supra,
n. 21), p. 51-52.
20

242
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has argued convincingly for the latter interpretation, citing a passage from Eusebius's
Life of Constantine in support of his case 23 . The law should therefore be referred to
as Constantinian in the dynastic rather than the individual sense 21.
For present purposes, the question of which emperor issued these fragments is
insignificant in comparison with the possibility of Justinianic interpolation. No one
would dispute the fact that Justinian's commission edited, rearranged, and reworded
the constitutions found in his Code, or that some provisions that were obsolete were
excluded. With regard to CJ 6.37.21, it cannot be denied that a law issued by
Justinian's chancellery in 531 had affirmed that formal words were unnecessary in
legacies andfideicommissa25 , and the complete fusion of the two institutions is rightly
attributed to the Justinianic period 26. Yet it is revealing to observe the account of
events given in the Institutes:
Inst. 2.20.1-2 (De legatis):
... Legatum itaque est donatio quaedam a defuncto relicta. Sed olim quidem erant legatorum
genera quattuor: per vindicationem, per damnationem, sinendi modo, per pracceptionem:
et certa quaedam verba cuique generi legatorum adsignata erant, per quae singula genera
legatorum significabantur. Sed ex constitutionibus divorum principum sollemnitas huiusmodi
23 Albanese (supra, n. 20), p. 785-787. The passage of Eusebius in question may be translated

as follows: '(De Vita Constantini4.26) ... And then, similarly, as regards people leaving life, the
ancient laws had determined that even in the last breath it was necessary for wills being set in
order to be dictated precisely with (specific) expressions of words and for specific methods and
words of a certain kind to be selected. And many bad things were done because of this against
the spirit of what the deceased had intended. Therefore, looking at these things together, the
emperor also altered this law, saying that the dying man should arrange things according to his
desire, with plain language and in the manner of speaking to which he was accustomed, and set
out his intention in whatever writing chanced to occur, and even, if he wished, without writing,
provided that he did this with witnesses present who were competent to guard the pledge with
honesty'.
The close parallels between Eusebius's account and CJ 6.23.15 have been admitted even by
Sargenti, who leans toward the attribution to Constantius. M. Sargenti, II diritto privato nella
legislazione di Costantino, in: Atti del Accademia Romanistica Costantiniana, I' Convegno
internazionale, [Perugia 1975], p. 229-332, esp. p. 297-298. Given that Eusebius probably died
on 30 May 339, moreover, as explained by T. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, Cambridge,
Mass. 1981, p. 263, it seems unlikely that he would have mistakenly attributed to Constantine
a law issued by the reigning emperor Constantius only four months previously. The evidence of
Eusebius is corroborated by the habitual issuance of laws at Serdica by Constantine as well as his
penchant for addressing edicts adpopulum,neither of which are frequently attested for Constantius,
and by a possible reference in CT 4.4.3 (396?), as Albanese demonstrates (supra, n. 20), p.
782-783 n. 17 and p. 787. Constantius still has his defenders, such as Sargenti (supra), p. 297
and 308-309, but no convincing case has been made in his favor. This conclusion seems to have
been reached by Voci, who has recently abandoned his former position in favor of an attribution
to Constantine. Compare P. Voci, Diritto ereditarioromano, II, Milan 1963, p. 129 and 234,
with P. Voci, I1 diritto ereditario romano nell'eth del tardo impero, I: Le costituzionidel IVsecolo,
in: Studi di diritto romano, II, Milan 1985, p. 95-96. Matthews, Laying down (supra, n. 10), p.
239, is in accord.
24 M. Amelotti, I1 testamento romano attraverso la prassi documentale, I, Florence 1966,
p. 249,
rightly points out that it makes little difference whether the law is attributed to Constantine or
his son unless the intent is to suggest that the emperor was personally involved in the legislative
process.
25 CJ 6.43.2. Cf. CJ 6.43.1 (529), which established a uniform procedural regime for all legacies
and fideicommissa.
26 Johnston (supra, n.1), p. 287-288.
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verborum penitus sublata est. nostra autem constitutio , quam cum magna fecimus
lucubratione, defunctorum voluntates validiores esse cupientes et non verbis, sed voluntatibus
eorum faventes, disposuit, ut omnibus legatis una sit natura et, quibuscumque verbis aliquid
derelictum sit, liceat legatariis id persequi non solum per actiones personales, sed etiam per
in rem et per hypothecariam: cuius constitutionis perpensum modum ex ipsius tenore
perfectissime accipere possible est ...21.

It is clear that the author of this passage (who, at least formally, is Justinian himself)
has no interest in downplaying Justinian's achievements. Rather than give Justinian
all the credit for reforming the ancient laws, however, the author refers to 'constitutiones
diuorumprincipum'by which the use of formal words in legacies 'penitussublata est'.
Kriger, in his edition of the Institutes, took this to include CJ 6.37.21, and his
suggestion seems eminently plausible 29. 'The passage makes it quite clear that formal
words in legacies were already unnecessary by 529, when real and hypothecary actions
were extended to all legatees. The essence of the Justinianic reform as described in
the Institutes, therefore, lay not in abolishing formal words, but in establishing a
uniform procedural regime for both fideicommissa and legacies. In general, it has been
argued that Justinian's compilers were not given the power to create new substantive
law30 , and one should certainly be cautious about suggesting interpolations when
there is no good reason to do so. In the absence of a compelling reason to believe
otherwise, we must accept that the points of substantive law presented in CJ 6.37.21
31
did not originate with Justinian .

CJ 6.43.1 (529).
The Institutesgoes on to discuss CJ 6.43.2 (531), in which all distinctions betweenfideicommissa
and legacies were completely abolished.
29 The use of the plural 'constitutionibus' is puzzling, but may be an allusion to the senatusconsultum
Neronianum, which apparently confirmed legacies 'quae uerborum uitio iure ciuili non ualent'
(Sabinus, quoted in Gai. Inst. 2.218). Although not technically a constitutio principis, the s.c.
Neronianumseems the most likely explanation, since the reference to legacies in Nov. Theod. 16
791
(439) was not reproduced in Justinian's Code, as pointed out by Albanese (supra, n. 20), p.
n. 27.
10 A. Watson, Prolegomena to establishingpre-Justinianictexts, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis,
62 (1994), p. 116.
" The only scholar who has recently proposed a possible interpolation in CJ 6.37.21 is Clemence
Dupont, though the object of her scalpel is not, interestingly enough, that which concerns legacies,
but rather the phrase 'uelfideicommissis'. C. Dupont, Les successions dans les constitutions de
Constantin, IVRA, 15 (1964), p. 62. Arguing that formal words had never been necessary in
fideicommissa, Dupont claims that Constantine would have had no motive to mention them: thus
Tribonian and his men 'ont sans doute proc~d6 distraitement l'interpolation, sans apercevoir
son inutilit6'. The suggestion that Justinian's compilers were prone to 'absent-minded' interpolation
is unsettling. It seems far more likely that the prevailing tendency in dealing with such a large
body of law would be to cut things out rather than insert new phrases when none were required.
More importantly, although the use of formal words infideicommissa was clearly unnecessary by
the time ofJustinian, it is possible that clarification on this point was still needed in Constantine's
day. Iffideicommissa were in fact understood from the beginning to be free of form, the frequent
examples in the sources of acceptable wordings are difcult to explain. See Johnston, op. cit.
(supra,n. 1), p. 155-156. The following passage from the Sententiae Pauli, for example, suggests
that some confusion regarding this point still persisted in the fourth century: PS 4.1.6:
'Fideicommittere his uerbis possumus ROGO PETO VOLO MANDO DEPRECOR CUPIO
INIUNGO. DESIDEROquoque et IMPERO uerba utilefaciuntfideicommissum. RELINQUO uero
et COMMENDO nullamfideicommissipariuntactionem'.
As pointed out by Johnston, p. 163-164, this list seems to present three categories: words that
have always been acceptable, words that were for some reason considered marginal but are now
27
21
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Of course, just because Justinian's compilers did not disguise their own reforms
as Constantinian law, it does not follow that his Code reproduced the entire constitution
as originally issued. One cause for suspicion is immediately apparent: while CJ
6.23.15pr.-1. refers specifically to the heredis institutio, CJ 6.23.15.2 speaks of all
testamentary instruments (quacumque instrumenti materia). This has led Albanese to
suggest that the fragment preserved in CJ 6.37.21 was inserted just before CJ 6.23.15.2
in the original edict 32. Such manipulation is typical of both the Theodosian and the
Justinianic compilers, who as a matter of course divided original constitutions into
fragments3 3.
More elusive, however, is the question what has been omitted from the original
sanction. Voci has suggested several provisions, including the requirements that a
sufficient number of witnesses be present, that the testament be qualified as such
from the outset, and that the contents be disclosed 34 . All of these possibilities seem
reasonable, but for the first we happen to have corroborating evidence, provided that
one does not attribute this legislation to Constantius. Eusebius, in describing an
edict of Constantine that Albanese and others have identified with CJ 6.23.15 and
6.37.21, mentions the presence of 'witnesses . . . who were competent to guard
the pledge with honesty (tcpTzpcov ... tflv ntiotTv Suvcstdw oiv &Xi 60Fiat qp)X&E,Ftv)' as a requirement the emperor included in his law. It would certainly be misguided
to attribute anything resembling legal precision to Eusebius's account 5 , and his
tendency to exaggerate the supposedly Christian achievements of Constantine is
obvious. Yet there is no reason to reject his account out of hand. If Constantine did
demand the presence of witnesses in his law, moreover, one can suggest why the
provision could have been omitted by Justinian's compilers as redundant, since other
constitutions in their Code discuss this requirement in greater detail 36.
Without making any definite claims, one can easily accept that CJ 6.23.15 and
6.37.21 probably had more to say about dispositions mortis causa than Justinian's
commission preferred to include. Nevertheless, the first question posed above has
been answered in the affirmative. Although many things in the original constitution
acceptable, and unacceptable words. Given that some doubt may have persisted regarding such
words as 'desidero' and 'impero', there would have been good reason for Constantine to affirm
once and for all that the observance of formal words was unnecessary infideicommissa. The burden
of proof thus rests on those who wish to suggest a Justinianic interpolation, and the argument
suggested by Dupont does not meet the challenge.
32 Albanese (supra, n. 20), p. 789-790.
33 E. Volterra, Jiproblemadel testo delle costituzioni imperiali, in: La critica del testo, Florence
1971, p. 1094-1095.
34 Voci, Ildiritto (supra,n. 23), p. 97-98. These last two suggested provisions are partially based
on the claim that they were repealed by Arcadius in CT 4.4.3 (396?), a questionable argument
given that Arcadius refers to a 'diui Constantini sanctionem' along with other precedents. Voci
corroborates his assertion, however, by citing parallel requirements in Constantinian laws regarding
donation and sale. Less convincing is the proposed reference to the fact that an heir could not be
instituted in codicils, resting solely on the later proclamation of this in CJ 6.36.7 (332).
11Sozomen, who had been a professional advocate, might be more reliable in this regard, see
J. Harries, Sozomen andEusebius. the lauyer as church historianin thefifth century, in: The inheritance
of historiography 350-900, C. Holdsworth and T.P. Wiseman eds., Exeter 1986, p. 47-48, but
there is no mention of CJ 6.23.15 or 6.37.21 in his EcclesiasticalHistory.
36 For testaments, the requirement is mentioned in CJ 6.23.12 (293), among other laws. Its
omission from CJ 6.37.21 may be explained by CJ 6.42.32 (531), in which Justinian waived the
need for witnesses infideicommissa when the beneficiary iswilling to undergo an oath concerning
calumny (cf. Inst. 2.23.12).
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may have been excised or rearranged, the essential content of CJ 6.37.21 and its
counterpart almost certainly belongs to the period covered by the CT. We must now
turn to the second question: whether some version of CJ 6.23.15 and 6.37.21 was
contained in the full Theodosian Code.
As pointed out by Rotondi, the evidence weighs heavily against any use by Justinian
of material belonging to the period covered by the Theodosian Code, but not contained
therein 37 . Not only do both of the laws authorizing the Theodosian compilation order
all constitutions from Constantine onward to be collected3 s , but the second also
declares that no constitution not contained in the Code may thereafter be cited in
court39 . Such a combination of inclusiveness and exclusiveness means that few
constitutions are likely to have survived independently over the next hundred years4° .
Moreover, Justinian's compilers were explicitly directed to select constitutions from
the three earlier codes4", which would seem to rule out the inclusion of constitutions
dating from the period covered by the Theodosian Code but not contained therein.
To conclude that CJ 6.23.15 and 6.37.21 were not in the Theodosian Code, one
would have to assume not only that Justinian's compilers had access to constitutions
preserved in the law schools or central imperial archives that were omitted from the
Theodosian Code42 yet somehow survived the promulgation of that Code, but also
that Justinian's compilers decided to include these constitutions notwithstanding
their instructions from the emperor.
Seizing upon this unlikely possibility, Gaudemet attempted to employ certain
fragments in the Code of Justinian as evidence in favor of an exclusive editorial policy
on the part of the Theodosian compilers. Examining the laws contained in the surviving
CT title De testamentis et codicillis, Gaudemet concluded that the compilers 'show
themselves to be demanding' regarding formal requirements 43 . This was then contrasted
with the Code of Justinian, which includes fragments such as CJ 6.23.15 and 6.37.21

37 Rotondi (supra, n. 10), p. 211-219.
31 CT 1.1.5 (429) and 6 (435).
39 CT 1.1.6.3 (435), repeated in Nov.

Tfheod. 1.6 (438). See A.J.B. Sirks, The Theodosian Code:
A study, Friedrichsdorf 2007, p. 201.
4 Regarding their fate immediately after the promulgation of the Code, Harries (supra, n. 35),
p. 48, suggests that Sozomen may have made use of legal sources not contained in the Theodosian
Code for his EcclesiasticalHistory, written in Constantinople during the 440s. This remains
conjectural, however, and in any event does not indicate that any such constitutions remained
available for consultation during the reign of Justinian.
41 C.

Haec,pr.

The likelihood of this possibility depends on the sources used by the Theodosian compilers.
According to A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire284-602: A sociaZ economic andadministrative
survey, Oxford 1964, T. Honor6, The making of the Theodosian Code, Zeitschrift der SavignyStiftung fir Rechtsgeschichte: Romanistische Abteilung, 103 (1986), p. 161-162, Matthews,
The making (supra, n. 16), p. 41, and others, the sorry state of central archives forced the Theodosian
commission to make extensive use of scattered provincial sources. This would imply that few
constitutions not in the Theodosian Code would have been available in Constantinople for
consultation by Justinian's compilers a century later. A.J.B. Sirks, however, assigns a more
prominent role to central imperial archives. Sirks (supra,n. 39), p. 151-152; B. Sirks, The sources
of the code, in: Harries and Wood (supra, n. 5), p. 49-52. Even the theory proposed by Sirks,
however, does not imply that there was any reason why Justinian's commission would have
42

bothered to make use of extraneous material when they had the full CT at their disposal and were

directed to use it.
11 'Pour y atteindre les compilateurs se sont montris exigeants sur les formes'; Gaudemet (supra,
n. 11), p. 429.
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that are more liberal in this regard4 4 . While acknowledging that the absence of these
constitutions in our edition of the CT may be a result of Visigothic editing, Gaudemet
was nonetheless inclined to attribute the omissions to the 'Theodosian compilers45 .
The supposed trend discerned by Gaudemet in the surviving Theodosian Code,
however, does not provide a convincing motive for the exclusion of CJ 6.37.21 and
its counterpart. First, it is not clear that CJ 6.23.15 and 6.37.21 would really have
been that much out of place in Theodosian Code 46. Second, we have evidence suggesting
that they were indeed included. In a Novel of 446, Valentinian III refers to the
'decisions of those emperors who with greater prudence in their own sanctions removed
the ambiguities of the ancient law (uetusti iuris ambages)', proclaiming that one can
now dictate a last judgment 'quoquomodo et quibuscumque uerbis'47. If the 'decisions'
alluded to include CJ 6.23.15, as seems likely4 8 , then in order to maintain its exclusion
from the Theodosian Code one must suppose that the Western emperor and his
consistory obtained a separate copy from another source49 . It is much easier to believe
that Valentinian's law is referring to the contents of the full Theodosian Code, and
that any alleged hostility to verbal formalism on the part of the Theodosian compilers
is an illusion. All things taken into consideration, therefore, it seems almost certain
that both CJ 6.23.15 and 6.37.21 were once in the TIheodosian Code.

4' Gaudemet (supra, n. 11), p. 431-434.
41 'On serait cependant enclin s attribuer ces omissions aux r~dacteurs du Code Th~odosien, car
elles t~moignent de ce souci d'6carter un trop grand libralisme dans l'appriciation des dispositions
de derni~re volont6 que l'on retrouve dans le choix des texts qu'ils ont fait figurer au Code';
Gaudemet (supra, n. 11), p. 434.
46 This is the conclusion reached by Matthews, Laying down (supra, n. 10), p. 236. CT 4.4.1
(326) and CT 4.4.4 (397), for example, do not reflect a hostile attitude to verbal formalism so
much as a demand that testamentary dispositions be properly witnessed and recorded. This is
also true of the final clause in CT 4.4.7 (424), although the constitution as a whole is more
complicated, as discussed above. As Johnston (supra,n. 1), p. 147, has argued, verbal informality
and evidentiary strictness tend to go hand in hand: 'the fewer the formal acts and declarations
required, the greater the need for informal acts to be properly attested'. It is quite possible, as
mentioned above, that the original Constantinian edict also required the presence of witnesses,
and thus CJ 6.23.15 and 6.37.21 need not have differed from other CT titles in this regard. Two
other laws cited by Gaudemet (CT 4.4.2 (389), on codicils and fideicommissa; CT 4.4.5 (416)
on unwritten declarations), moreover, are specifically concerned with dispositions that benefit
the emperor and his relatives. Most importantly, there exists one constitution in the surviving
Theodosian Code that even Gaudemet acknowledged to be 'liberal', for it specifies that superfluous
things written in a testament do not make it invalid. CT 4.4.3 (396?); cf. Gaudemet (supra, n.
11), p. 429 n. 51.
47 Nov. Val. 21.1.3 (446).
48 The words 'quibuscumque uerbis' are found in CJ 6.23.15, and the removal
of 'uetusti iuris
ambages' sums up the spirit of the Constantinian legislation. The other 'decision' referred to is
almost undoubtedly CJ 6.23.19 (413), likewise excluded from the Mommsen edition of the
Theodosian Code. The reference to 'quibuscumque uerbis', however, is not found in what survives
of Honorius's law, and may therefore derive from CJ 6.23.15. The use of the plural 'declarant'
in Nov. Val. 21.1.3 (446) suggests that this is correct.
4' Given that the bureaucratic center of the empire was located in the East, along with the major
law schools, it is by no means clear how an independent copy of an edict issued over a century
before could have been easily procured in Rome, let alone why anyone would have bothered to
do so. The predominance of Western legislation in the CT does not imply Western archival or
administrative efficiency, since these constitutions could easily have been taken from collections
made by lawyers and interested private individuals. See Matthews, The making (supra, n. 16), p.
43.
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Assuming that these constitutions were in the Theodosian Code, it remains finally
to consider where in the Code they might have been located. One possibility, followed
by Krdger in his unfinished reconstruction of the Code ° , is that both fragments were
included, either together or separately, under the existing CT rubric 'De testamentis
et codicillis'. This would imply that the isolation of the fragment regardingfideicommissa
and legacies under a separate title was the work of the Justinianic compilers. A second
possibility, however, is that Justinian merely followed the pre-existing arrangement
of the Theodosian Code. This would give us a separate, lost CT rubric not found in
Mommsen's edition, called either 'De legatis' or 'De legatis etfideicommissis"'. Yet
one can even conceive of a third scenario: that the contents of CJ 6.37.21 were split
between two rubrics of the CT, with the reference to legacies combined with the
fragment now preserved in CJ 6.23.15 under CT 4.4 De testamentis et codicillis and
a separate fragment presented under a lost CT title Defideicommissis. The latter
fragment might look something like this:
... In fideicommissis uerborum necessaria non sit obseruantia, ita ut nihil prorsus intersit,
quis talem uoluntatem uerborum casus exceperit aut quis loquendi usus effuderit ....
This reconstruction is, of course, wholly conjectural, but it is supported by a
tendency in late postclassical law to treatfideicommissaas a 'type of succession which
rivals succession by will' 5 2 .

Confronted with such an arrangement in the CT, Justinian's commissioners could
have moved the reference to legacies to CJ 6.37.21 and relocated the hybrid constitution
under the rubric 'De legatis', in keeping with the new procedural equivalence of the
two institutions. Given that flexibility in operative language was a hallmark of
fideicommissa even in the classical period 53 , however, it is not clear why the CT
compilers would need to reemphasize the relatively informal nature offideicommissa
by isolating the fragment onfideicommissafrom the Constantinian reform as a whole.
Thus, while a separate CT title Defideicommissis can be imagined, the CJ evidence
in its favor is not particularly strong - but neither does the CJ give us any reason to
assume that no such separate title existed. Until more compelling evidence is adduced,
the third question suggested at the beginning must remain unanswered.
The probable inclusion of the fragment preserved in CJ 6.37.21 in the full Theodosian
Code indicates that any apparent lack of attention tofideicommissa is not to be blamed
on the editorial practices of the compilers. Nevertheless, even if one could be led to
accept CJ 6.37.21 as the basis for a suppressed rubric 'Defideicommissis' in the
Theodosian Code, nothing in the above analysis has seriously challenged the notion
that the Theodosian constitutions simply had less to say about civil-law institutions
such asfideicommissa than their counterparts in the Diocletianic codes. Yet the Code
P. Kriger ed., TheodosianiFasciculusI, Berlin 1923, p. 126-27.
" The second possibility would imply that Justinian has divided the original CT title De legatis
into two, one 'De legatis' and another 'Defideicommissis'.
52 Johnston (supra, n. 1), p. 150. Of the examples cited by Johnston that demonstrate this
50

tendency, CT 16.9.4 (417) and CT 4.4.7 (424) are the latest as well as the most clear. All of the

constitutions that seem to associate fideicommissa with legacies are earlier: CT 8.18.5 (349);
3.8.2pr (381); 12.1.107 (384). The evidence is scanty, but suggests a gradual isolation offideicommissa
from legacies over time.
53 See, e.g., G. 2.281; Johnston (supra, n. 1), p. 155-169.
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of Justinian cannot be relied upon to correct all the omissions of the Visigoths, and
it is quite possible that more constitutions regardingfideicommissa and other aspects
of inheritance law have been irrevocably lost. CJ 6.37.21 should serve to caution
historians who seek to judge the Theodosian Code according to its surviving contents.
If we do not attempt to take into account the omissions of the Breviary, we are likely
to mistake Alaric's codification for that of Theodosius 5 4 .

would like to thank Lisa Hasday, Tony Honor6, David Johnston, Rolf Knitel, and Boudewijn
Sirks for their comments on this article. This research was made possible in part by a generous
grant from the Emily Parker Endowed Faculty Research Fund at SMU Dedman School of
51I

Law.

